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DAvm

L. FAiGMAN*

Introduction
Balancing schemes are criticized as inherently flawed because
they require courts to compare incomparable factors.' According to
its critics, the balancing metaphor founders because it fails to identify
a common scale that can measure the disparate factors that compose
majority will on the one hand and individual liberty on the other. Is it
possible, a critic might ask, to weigh the individual's right to express
herself by dancing in the nude against society's interest in regulating
an activity it believes contributes to prostitution, drug abuse, and urban blight? Is it possible, as Justice Scalia queried and the present
Symposium is dedicated to exploring, to compare the length of a line
to the weight of a rock?2 But comparing lines and rocks seems incongruous only because they do not have any obvious connection. Government power and individual freedom, in contrast, are intimately
connected through constitutional theory.
Balancers have failed to adequately answer the so-called apples
and oranges complaint because they have been unable to specify a
common denominator. The simple reason why proponents of balancing have failed in this endeavor is that no common denominator exists.
But accepting this proposition does not compel the conclusion that
balancers' attempts to reconcile individual liberties and government
interests are wrong. Instead, this Article argues that proponents and
opponents alike, blinded by the balancing metaphor, have been asking
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
*

YALE LJ. 943, 972 (1987); see also Huoo L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 50-52

(1968); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449
(1962).
2. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
[753]
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the wrong question. Although no common denominator exists, liberty
and government interests are intimately related. The challenge lies in
describing that relationship.
Liberty and government power are independent factors; in fact,
their independence is a basic component of our constitutional system. 3
In other words, we are comparing apples and oranges when we attempt to reconcile liberty and government power. However, the fact
that liberty and power are independent does not mean that they are
unrelated or that they cannot be measured for purposes of comparison. The balancing equation has historically omitted the most important factor, the resultant. The factors of liberty and government
power together define a third factor: constitutionality.
Consider the most famous equation in physics, e=mc 2 . This equation states that mass multiplied by the speed of light squared equals
energy. Mass and the speed of light have no common denominator;
they are independent factors that combine to define a third factor.
The lack of a common denominator does not mean that they are unrelated or that their values cannot be described in "weighted" (i.e., numerical) units. To be sure, the relationship between liberty and
government interests is not the multiplicative relationship that pertains to mass and the speed of light squared. Nonetheless, the relationship of liberty and government justifications to each other and to a
third factor, constitutionality, can be described roughly in the form of
an equation.
In an earlier article, I introduced a model of constitutional adjudication I referred to as "Madisonian Balancing."'4 It offered a comprehensive strategy by which to integrate constitutional values and
constitutional facts in a way that, first, would be consistent with the
Constitution's foundational structure and, second, would provide
judges with a framework in which to reconcile conflicting government
interests and individual rights. This Article expands and modifies several essential aspects of my earlier work. First, as this Introduction
indicates, I am no longer convinced that the balancing metaphor is
useful in describing the inevitable comparison of liberty and government interests in constitutional adjudication. Instead, an equation or
3.

See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:

Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice,78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1526-29 (1992)

[hereinafter Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests]; infra notes
6-14 and accompanying text.
4. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman, Madisonian Balancing].
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algebraic model, which I will refer to as "Constitutional Modeling,"
more accurately portrays the relationship. In my earlier work, I described "constitutionality" as the common scale upon which both liberty and power could be assessed. I now understand
"constitutionality" to be the third factor described by the two independent factors of liberty and power. Part I of this Article reviews
the basic tenets of Madisonian Balancing and describes how Constitutional Modeling departs from it. Part II examines the implications
and ramifications of describing constitutional adjudication in this algebraic fashion. Finally, Part III details my proposal to aggregate rights
in constitutional adjudication.5 The government's justification for infringements of individual liberty should be measured on a transactional basis rather than, as is now done, on an amendment-byamendment basis. A transactional perspective would require courts
to account for the liberty or freedom infringed by a particular government action in its entirety. This focus would allow courts to account
for the entire strength of the government's justification as well as the
full value of individual liberty when deriving "constitutionality."
I.

"Madisonian Balancing"

Although I have modified the metaphor, the premises underlying
Madisonian Balancing not only remain viable, but actually fit Constitutional Modeling better. In fact, aspects of Madisonian Balancing
were in conflict with my principal operating premise, which drew a
strict division between defining liberty and reconciling that defined
liberty with the government's justification. I too suffered the myopia
induced by the balancing metaphor and wasted my efforts searching
for the common denominator shibboleth. Nonetheless, the process I
previously described as Madisonian Balancing offers a basis for adjudication that fully incorporates the foundational premises of the Constitution and offers precise guidelines to judges who must maneuver
through the rocky shoals of constitutional adjudication.
Madisonian Balancing took as its starting point the fundamental
dilemma endemic to American constitutional democracy. 6 Constitutional Modeling also begins-indeed describes-this basic dilemma.
On the one hand, democratic majorities have the power to rule as they
desire, while, on the other hand, individuals enjoy certain rights that
5. Id. at 661-64.
6. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATC THEORY 22-24 (1956); see
also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMmNo OF AMERICA 39-41 (1990).
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protect them from majoritarian interference in particular spheres.
The two guiding principles of American constitutional democracy, the
majoritarian principle and the liberty principle, stand in constant tension. Courts are called upon to resolve this tension, or "Madisonian
dilemma," through constitutional adjudication by ascertaining and policing the boundary between these two spheres of power. 7 Any error
in ascertaining the boundary between the majority's right to rule and a
minority's legitimate right to be free of such rule results in "tyranny."
Whereas majoritarian interference with protected rights constitutes
tyranny by the majority, denial of the majority's power to rule in
8
spheres not specifically protected constitutes tyranny by the minority.
Constitutional Modeling embraces a precise distinction between
the power of the majority to act through democratic means and the
freedom of the individual in specific spheres of behavior. As a consequence of the fact that government power and individual freedom are
distinct principles, they can-indeed must-be defined and measured
independently. This independence is necessitated by both constitutional theory (what I refer to as the Madisonian model 9) and empirical
expedience. As a matter of constitutional theory, it would be illegitimate to define individual liberty by virtue of the majority's reasons for
acting. As Professor Robert A. Dahl has explained, to allow the majority to decide "whether the punishing of some specified act would or
would not be tyrannical ... is precisely what Madison meant to prevent, and moreover would make the concept of majority tyranny
meaningless."' 10 If the Bill of Rights operates as a bulwark against
tyranny, the majority's reasons for acting cannot define what actions
constitute tyranny."
Empirical expedience also requires independent calculation, if
only to avoid sloppiness in the measurement process. Importing government interests into the definition of rights confuses the meaning of
those rights for future cases. Because government interests are casespecific, incorporation of these considerations when defining rights

7. BORK, supra note 6, at 39-41.
8. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,47
IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971).
9. See Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note
3, at 1526-39.
10. Dahl, supra note 6, at 24.
11. For an extended discussion of this argument from constitutional theory, see
Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note 3, at 1526-29.
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will inevitably muddy the characterization of, those rights.' 2 Power
and freedom, while intimately related in American constitutionalism,
are separate principles that must be described in isolation before they
can be factored together.
Although the strict division between majority will and individual
liberty is an essential component of Constitutional Modeling, I do not
mean to suggest that majorities do not sometimes act for reasons
aimed at protecting basic freedoms, for surely they do. But
majoritarian benevolence toward individual freedom is still a "government interest," irrespective of the definitional source of that interest.
Majorities obtain the power to effectuate freedoms contained in the
Bill of Rights from the same sources that they obtain the power to
pursue any legitimate government objective. For states, this power
comes from the common-law police power and for the federal government it comes from the power-granting provisions, such as Articles I,
II, and III of the Constitution.' 3 That the government interest echoes

in the Bill of Rights might affect the weight the interest receives, but it
does not alter its character. And even when such echoes sound, we
should beware, for, as Justice Brandeis warned, "[e]xperience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the govern-

ment purposes are beneficent. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without
understanding."14
The Court's role as expositor of the boundary between
majoritarian will and individual freedom requires it to measure constitutional values in sundry real-world contexts. As a practical matter,
the Court must define the values of the Constitution and apply them
12. The Court's proclivity for importing government interest analysis into rights definition occurs throughout constitutional adjudication and, therefore, most rights have been
muddied by this treatment at one time or another. A particularly clear illustration of this
practice is Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), in which the Court examined the constitutionality of a hair length regulation for policemen. Whereas Justice Rehnquist seemed to
accept that the general citizenry might have a fundamental right over matters of personal
appearance, he concluded that no such right existed when policemen were concerned. Because he found no fundamental right, he applied only rational basis review. But the fact
that the petitioner is a policeman does not affect the existence of the right; it is part of the
justification for infringing that right, if one exists. For an extensive analysis of the perverting effect this confusion of rights definition and government interest analysis has on
constitutional analysis, see Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note 3.
13. There are, of course, many power-granting provisions in the Constitution, including section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
so on. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 2 and amend. XIV, § 5.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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under specific factual conditions. Unfortunately, neither the values
nor the facts of constitutional adjudication are known with certainty.
Thus, the Court must craft certain decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The Court brings essentially two methods to this task, one
rules-based and the other standards-based. 15
Consider, for example, the extension of a law prohibiting all public nudity to nude dancing in adult theatres. 16 Although there are a
variety of ways to analyze the constitutionality of this law, most analysts begin with the question whether nude dancing falls within the
category of "free speech" covered by the First Amendment.' 7 One
argument might maintain that nude dancing is not speech at all, either
because it is "conduct" and not "speech" or, alternatively, because it
does not implicate the Free Speech Clause since, here, it is prohibited
pursuant to a uniform law of general application. 8 Under this view,
nude dancing, like obscenity, falls outside the free speech category.
This categorical method has the advantage of lending an air of certainty to constitutional adjudication. The disadvantage of rules-based
approaches is that they are both under- and over-inclusive; not all
"speech" is protected absolutely and much "expressive conduct" is indistinguishable from "speech."
In contrast, a standards-based argument might maintain that
nude dancing is covered by the Free Speech Clause, but the law's constitutionality depends on balancing the speech right against the government's reasons for regulating nude dancing. This balancing
method has the seeming advantage of accounting for the many subtle
values implicit in the broad ambiguities within the constitutional text.
The disadvantage with balancing tests is that they provide little guidance to, and put few restraints on, courts.
Constitutional Modeling offers a method of adjudication that incorporates elements of a rules-based approach, but assumes its main
identity in the application of standards. It is a process that explicitly
incorporates burdens of proof and the insights of presumptions in order to allocate the responsibility to articulate and demonstrate both
the values and facts necessary to constitutional adjudication between
15. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 24 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
17. Id. at 2460 (finding that nude dancing is "within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though.., only marginally so").
18. See id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe challenged regulation . . . [is] a
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression."); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
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the parties. 19 Constitutional Modeling incorporates evidentiary constructs to assign the obligation of identifying and defining constitutional values and of finding and substantiating constitutional facts.
This process embraces a formalistic element: The initial process of
evaluating the liberty interests in particular cases establishes the respective burdens of proof. This formalistic element provides guidance
for the discretion inherent in the constitutional text. Constitutional
Modeling prevents courts from engaging in a free-for-all assessment of
the social or economic good, but also avoids the problems attendant
with rigid categorical analysis; it allows a process of guided discretion.
Valuation of the liberty interest, it should be emphasized, is not rightspecific and represents the depth of the total liberty concern infringed
by the government action.20 The modeler seeks to assess the full impact of a government action on liberty and factor it with the justification for that action in order to assess constitutionality.
Constitutional Modeling explicitly embraces two concepts from
the trial process that are designed to allocate the risk of error in the
very uncertain business of fact-finding, burdens of proofand presumptions.21 For present purposes, it is important to note that the burden
of proof in evidence actually comprises two separate terms: the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. The burden of production refers to the placement of the initial burden on one of the
parties to bring forward evidence sufficient for a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that the pertinent fact is true. In civil cases, the
party desiring to change the status quo normally bears the production
burden, though this allocation may be reversed in order to effectuate
some substantive policy. In criminal cases, the state nearly always
22
bears the initial burden to come forward with sufficient evidence.
The production burden thus refers to the judge's responsibility to
measure the evidence to ensure that it is sufficient to permit the trier
of fact to decide the matter.

19. This Part's discussion of the model relies heavily on the original description of the
model of Madisonian Balancing in Faigman, Madisonian Balancing,supra note 4, at 664-

70.
20. The argument for aggregating rights is presented in Part III infra.
21. Space does not permit a full discussion of the evidentiary use for these concepts,
but the interested reader should consult my earlier work for a fuller examination. See
Faigman, MadisonianBalancing,supra note 4, at 658-60.
22. In criminal cases, the defendant will sometimes bear the burden to produce evidence sufficient to demonstrate an affirmative defense such as self-defense or incompetence to stand trial. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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In contrast, the burden of persuasion refers to the confidence that
the triers of fact must evince in their conclusion. The burden of persuasion is ordinarily borne by the same party who bears the burden of
production; the plaintiff usually carries it in civil cases and the prosecution bears it in criminal cases. After all the evidence has been introduced, the trier of fact reaches a conclusion based on a standard of
confidence (i.e., a preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt). This spectrum,
ranging from a tie-breaking standard to a standard requiring near certainty, reflects corresponding levels of concern over the consequences
flowing from factual error. In most civil cases, the preponderance
standard illustrates that although some tie-breaking mechanism is
needed in these cases, the system is indifferent about the allocation of
error between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants and, by custom, the
law has favored the status quo. 23 In contrast, the stringent beyond-areasonable-doubt standard illustrates the strong systemic preference
favoring the defendant when mistakes are made.
The second concept Modeling borrows from the law of evidence
is the presumption. Although a variety of evidentiary devices are labeled as presumptions, the only true presumption is the "rebuttable
presumption. '' 24 Two forms of the rebuttable presumption exist: One
shifts the burden of production, and the other shifts the burden of
persuasion. The basic principle behind the presumption is that proof
of a basic fact or facts compels acceptance of a presumed fact, unless
the opponent demonstrates by some quantum of proof that the presumed fact is otherwise. The production-shifting presumption provides that once the beneficiary of the presumption demonstrates the
basic fact, the opponent bears the burden of producing some evidence
disputing the presumed fact. The beneficiary of the production-shifting presumption, however, continues to bear the risk of nonpersuasion
on the merits. In contrast, once the beneficiary of a persuasion-shifting presumption demonstrates the basic fact or facts, the opponent
bears both the burden to produce evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion on the merits.
23. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 57475 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
24. Id. § 342, at 578-79. Two other devices regularly labeled as presumptions are the
permissive, or standardized, inference and the conclusive presumption. The former merely
denotes a logical relationship between facts, such that knowing one fact increases the likelihood that another fact is true. The latter is a substantive rule of law whereby proof of one
fact compels acceptance of a second fact; no amount of proof will suffice to rebut the
presumed fact.
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The intuitive connection between the constructs of the burden of
proof and presumption and the Madisonian model is simple and direct. Because the Madisonian model slightly privileges majoritarian
will at the systemic level, the initial burden of production falls upon
the challenger of the majoritarian action. The challenger's burden of
production has two components. The challenger must demonstrate to
the satisfaction of a reasonable court: (1) that the government action
infringed some constitutional liberty; and (2) what the nature and
scope of that liberty concern is. Once the challenger has met this production burden, the burden shifts to the state to justify the infringement. Whether this shift switches the burden of persuasion or merely
switches the burden of production depends on the nature of the constitutional liberty infringed. The government's burden has two components. The government must show: (1) the legitimacy and strength
of its interest; and (2) the factual nexus between the government's
interest and the action taken to achieve that interest.
The evidentiary analogy supplies constitutional analysis with an
array of standards by which to measure constitutional liberty and government interests when they conflict. Once the challenger has met
her burden of production by showing that the government action has
implicated the Constitution, the allocation and strength of the burden
of proof depend on the nature and scope of the liberty concern. I
propose four levels at which the challenger might demonstrate that
the Constitution has been infringed: (1) marginally; (2) consequentially; (3) centrally; and (4) at its core. Infringements on the constitutional margins shift only the burden of production while those that are
consequential, central, or at the core also shift the burden of persuasion, albeit at different standards. 25
Infringements on the Constitution's margins shift the burden of
production to the state to explain how its action is related to a legitimate interest. Unlike the current rational basis test, the state truly
bears the responsibility to articulate a legitimate interest as well as to
demonstrate the nexus between its action and this objective. The
challenger, however, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to refute
the legitimacy of the interest or, by empirical proof, the nexus between the interest and action. After the government has met its burden of production, the challenger bears the burden of persuasion, to
show that, more likely than not, the government's action is
unconstitutional.
25. See Faigman, Madisonian Balancing,supra note 4, at 664-67.
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The three remaining categories of constitutional liberty shift the
ultimate burden of persuasion to the government. Once the challenger has demonstrated the existence of a consequential liberty concern, the state must demonstrate that in light of the value of the
interest, and the factual nexus between its action and that objective,
its action is more likely than not constitutional. When a centralliberty
concern has been infringed, the state must show that its interest, and
the factual nexus between its action and that objective, are clearly and
convincingly constitutional. Finally, when a core liberty concern is infringed, the government is required to show that its interest, and the
factual nexus between its action and that objective, are constitutional
beyond a reasonabledoubt.
This model of constitutional adjudication is graphically depicted
in Figure A. Figure A illustrates the basic relationship between individual liberty and government justifications with the y-axis describing
the levels of freedom and the x-axis describing the corresponding burden of proof placed on the government. Several important aspects of
Figure A merit highlighting. Most notably, liberty and government
interests are on separate axes, which is consistent with the premise
that they are independent factors. In addition, where the divisions
occur between types of freedoms along the y-axis as well as where
they occur between government interests along the x-axis is a matter
of substantive constitutional theory. Whether speech, therefore, is
more fundamental than, say, reproductive freedom is not specified by
this model; the model does, however, assume that different kinds of
freedoms can be compared. Similarly, the slope of the line dividing
the constitutional domain of government actions from the unconstitutional domain of government actions also depends on the decision
maker's substantive theory of constitutional law. Figure A merely describes the connection between liberty and government interests in
the process of constitutional adjudication.
Modeling alters the focus of the balancing metaphor in important
respects. Traditional balancing tests call upon courts, in a rather
vague fashion, to compare the strength of the government's interest to
the value of a specific constitutional right. The tests, however, do not
provide any mechanism by which this evaluation can be accomplished,
nor do they account for the factual components inherent in the analysis. Modeling clarifies and specifies the elements of the test. First, it
inquires into the nature and scope of the full constitutional infringement; and second, when evaluating the strength of the government
justification, Modeling considers with what degree of certainty is it
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Figure A
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known that the government's action achieves the articulated objective.
This approach incorporates the common-sense idea that the value of
facts must be discounted by the risk that they are false. For instance, a
government justification such as the deterrent effect of capital punishment is stronger the more confident we are that such a connection
exists. Within the tiers of Modeling, the court must assess the importance of the government interest as well as the likelihood that the action truly accomplishes that interest. Together, the answers to these
two inquiries establish the strength of the government justification for
valuation purposes. 2 6
26. Although Constitutional Modeling was conceptualized in the context of the clash
between individual rights and government interests, its insights apply to other constitutional contexts that require evaluation of competing interests. In Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, for instance, the courts balance the state's interest in health and safety
against the burden the legislation puts on interstate commerce. Just as in the context of
individual liberties, in Dormant Commerce Clause cases the strength of the state's justification depends on how confident we are about the facts on which it is based.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), provides a useful example. Iowa passed a law banning the use of 65-foot double tractor trailers on its highways. Iowa claimed, among other things, that the law was justified because the presence of
longer trailers on Iowa roads would increase the number of deaths on Iowa roads. The
truck company argued first that the larger trucks were at least as safe as the smaller ones
and, second, that the reloading and rerouting necessitated by the Iowa law would burden
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The tools of the trial process provide a sensible method by which

to regulate the process of proof (both empirical and normative) in
constitutional adjudication. Yet, these tools are entirely procedural
and merely assume the existence of a substantive foundation that will

permit rational comparison of liberty and government power. The
next Part considers whether such a foundation exists and examines

whether such a foundation is strong enough to support the constitutional structure to be built upon it.
H. The Constitutionality Equation
As noted above, the principal complaint offered against balancing

as a constitutional method is that there is no common scale on which
to measure the disparate values inherent in the government's reasons
for acting and the individual's right to be free of that action. This is

commonly referred to as the apples and oranges complaint.27 In the
constitutional context, the complaint is not that interests and rights
cannot be compared as a theoretical matter, but rather that no single
scale appears constitutionally mandated. 28 In short, the balancing

method is an unappealing option as long as the balancing mechanism
itself cannot be specified.
Constitutional Modeling seeks to solve the apples and oranges
complaint by accepting it. Accepting the apples and oranges com-

plaint has two consequences that form the basis for Constitutional
Modeling. First, liberty and government interests must be measured
separately. Second, these independent factors describe a third factor,
constitutionality. The relationship between these three factors is a
fairly simple one. As the value of liberty and the strength of the govinterstate commerce by leading to more accidents and deaths on the highways surrounding
Iowa.
Before conducting a straightforward comparison between the deaths claimed to be
saved by the Iowa law and the deaths claimed to be caused by the Iowa law, we must have
some idea of the true value of the respective sides' data. In conducting this evaluation, the
strength of the state interest depends not simply on the interest alleged-avoidance of 100
highway deaths a year-but also on how confident the Court is that the law will achieve
this purpose. Thus, if Iowa alleges that its law avoids 100 deaths a year, with 25% confidence, and the truck company's data indicates the law will cause 50 deaths, with 90% confidence, the interstate burden is greater than the benefit to the state: expected benefit =
avoidance of 25 deaths in Iowa; expected burden = 45 deaths outside Iowa. Under the
ordinary practice of measuring the weight of an interest underlying a government action
without knowing the factual likelihood that the action will achieve the asserted interest, the
result of this comparison of the respective burdens on Iowa and surrounding states would
have been unrealistic and inaccurate.
27. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 972.
28. Id. at 973-76; Frantz, supra note 1, at 1440.
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ernment's justification both proportionally increase, constitutionality
remains constant. Similarly, as both factors proportionally decrease,
constitutionality remains constant. But as the government's justification increases and liberty remains constant or decreases, constitutionality increases. And finally, as liberty increases and the government's
justification remains constant or decreases, constitutionality decreases. These premises describe a relationship that can be depicted
very roughly by the following algebraic formula, in which C = Constitutionality, G = Government Justifications, and L = Liberty:
C= G/L
This formula illustrates constitutionality as a function of liberty
and government justifications in the way described above. It is an
oversimplified illustration because in this form the equation depicts
constitutionality increasing at a far higher rate than it decreases. The
29
full mathematical description is somewhat more complicated.
Both government justifications and liberty can be separately
graphed as predictors of constitutionality. (See Figures B and C, respectively.) Also, government interests and liberty can be graphed.
(See Figure D.) As Figure B illustrates, when liberty is held constant
government justifications positively predict constitutionality; and Figure C illustrates that when government justifications are held constant, liberty negatively predicts constitutionality. In other words,
when liberty is removed from the equation, the greater the government interests, the more likely the action will be deemed constitutional. When government interests are removed from the equation,
the greater the liberty concern, the more likely the action will be unconstitutional. When considered separately, therefore, government
interests should be positively correlated with findings of constitutionality, whereas liberty should be negatively correlated with findings of
constitutionality. These hypotheses, of course, are not particularly
novel and should not be particularly controversial.
Figure D illustrates the assumption that government interests and
liberty are, essentially, independent. In other words, there is no correlation between liberty and government interests. This hypothesis also
should not be controversial, though it might seem so at first. For instance, the value of an individual's right of political expression does
not depend on whether the government's suppression is based on
avoidance of "a clear and present danger" or on an objection to the
29. See infra note 30.
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content of the message; the definition of the right is independent of
the reasons the government might offer for infringing the right.
Figure B

Constitutionality

x

Individual
Liberty

The mathematics of the relationship become somewhat more
complicated when government justifications and liberty are factored
together as predictors of constitutionality. In fact the graph now
needed to illustrate the relationship must be rendered in three dimensions. (See Figure E.) A plane, rather than a straight line, predicts
30
the best fit between the three variables.
To be sure, the values attributed to liberty and government interests are largely subjective and will change from judge to judge.
30. In the simplest case, when you have one factor that predicts a second factor, the
relationship can be defined as a straight line, y = a + bx, where a is the y intercept and b is
the slope. This relationship is described mathematically as follows: C = P0 + 131G + P2L +
1312 GL. This formula is a multiple regression equation for interactions in which 13are the
regression coefficients. See DAVID G. KLEINBAUM & LAWRENCE L. KUPPER, APPLIED
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIABLE METHODS 180-82 (1978).
The regression coefficients are solved by the following formulas:
131=
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Figure C
Y
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Justifications
Whether the right of reproductive choice, for instance, is more or less
fundamental than the right to free political expression is not a question that has a definite, objective answer. Modeling is merely a
method of constitutional adjudication; it is not a substitute for substantive value definition. But once a judge has assigned values to the respective factors, the scale should describe her judgments concerning
31
the respective constitutionality of a range of government actions.
This means that the basic challenge of those who question whether we
can compare the length of a line to the weight of a rock is testable.
The empirically testable proposition that flows from Constitutional
Modeling is that if people are given the opportunity to identify the
value of different instances of liberty and different instances of government justifications, their intuitive judgments of constitutionality
when these factors are presented together will be described as an interaction.3 2 Although the values are subjective, in theory, the model

31. The scale's predictive accuracy is an empirical question that I have yet to research.
The reader, however, is invited to graph a series of government actions and determine for
herself whether the scale captures her judgments of constitutionality.
32. See supra note 30.
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should allow comparisons across constitutional contexts for specific
33
individuals.
It should be emphasized that even though the values assigned to

liberty and government justifications may be subjective, they are not
arbitrary. For instance, few, if any, judges would rank artistic expression above political expression; disagreements about order of constitutional values is a matter subject to debate and persuasion. Moreover,

these factors are not entirely subjective and normative. In most cases,
the magnitude of the government's justification is a combination of

normative and empirical factors. For example, consider a state regulation mandating fetal viability testing at twenty weeks. This statute is

justified on the basis of the state's normative judgment that viable feFigure D
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33. Because an individual's judgments of constitutionality can be ascertained, together with her valuations of liberty and government power, her general constitutional
perspective can be represented graphically. The slope of the lines describing an individual's judgments of the degree of liberty at stake, the government's justifications, and her
ultimate determination of constitutionality for specific constitutional problems should reflect her political outlook. For instance, someone who is strongly majoritarian should generate "constitutional curves" with very steep slopes, while someone who is less deferential
to the majority will generate constitutional curves with less steep slopes.
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tuses should be protected as well as the state's empirical belief that
the prescribed tests will accurately identify viable fetuses. 34 To be
sure, a very strong normative purpose in some cases will offset a weak
empirical basis just as a strong empirical basis will offset a relatively
weak normative purpose. In the end, the overall persuasiveness of the
government's justification-its value-will be a function of both normative and empirical considerations.
Consideration of a specific constitutional context will help illustrate how Modeling ties individual liberty and government power together for comparative purposes. Perhaps in no other area is the
complaint that the factors composing power and freedom are incommensurable more strongly voiced than in the abortion cases. These
34. See generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 45 Hastings L.J. 769 1993-1994

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

cases present a dizzying array of rights and government interests. The
right of reproductive choice has at least two possible sources in the
Bill of Rights: the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. 35 On the other side of the equation, the two most often cited
government interests are maternal health and the potential life of the
fetus. In what manner can these disparate elements be described
uniformly?
First, as noted above, rights and government interests must be
evaluated independently. To begin with, in accordance with Modeling, the challenger of government action must define the nature of the
liberty and specify its strength. This assessment is done, as described
in detail below, on a transactional basis. Relying on both the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses, we might expect that the challenger could demonstrate at least a central liberty concern embraced
by the Bill of Rights. 36 The Constitution extends substantial protection from the state in matters of reproductive choice. If this protection is deemed a central liberty concern, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the government to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that
its action was justified.
The government's justification for a law infringing the liberty of
reproductive choice depends on the specific context, and as more than
one government interest combines to support some action, the measurement process becomes increasingly complicated. For instance, a
parental consent provision for minors seeking abortions arguably has
several objectives, including safeguarding maternal health, preserving
the integrity of the family, and protecting the potential life of the fetus. When the government justifies its action with more than one of
these interests, the Court must measure them together. In constitutional terms, it does not matter whether the government's action is
supported by one very large interest or several small interests that add
up to one very large interest. Although the mathematics are not precise, it is not an intuitively difficult calculation to perform. In fact, the
Court has always done this addition.
In measuring whether the government's action clearly and convincingly "outweighs" the liberty concern, the Court uses the model of
constitutionality. This model measures whether the governmental intrusion is justified in light of the strength of the liberty concern. This
35. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
955, 985-86 & n.115 (1984).
36. See generally Faigman, Madisonian Balancing, supra note 4, at 691; supra notes
25-26 and accompanying text.
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model permits specific comparisons. Consider, for example, the
choices available for state legislators who wish to have parents participate in their daughters' decisions regarding abortion. Lawmakers
have a number of different schemes to choose from, ranging from a
two-parent consent without judicial bypass requirement to a one-parent notification with judicial bypass provision. These alternatives can
be rank-ordered relatively easily according to the normative strength
and empirical support for the government's scheme. 37 On one end,
the most justified alternative is the one-parent notification with judicial bypass requirement. 38 Along the scale are one-parent consent
without judicial bypass, two-parent consent with judicial bypass, twoparent notification without judicial bypass, and so on. Even though
there might be some disagreement over where some particular scheme
sits on the scale, it is not likely to be very great. Instead, substantial
disagreement is likely to concentrate on what point a government regulation passes constitutional muster. Disagreement will center on
where to draw the line of demarcation between the state and the individual, not on the existence of a single model that illuminates the
choice.
Conceptually, under Constitutional Modeling the government's
interest in protecting the life of the fetus is not balanced against the
woman's right of reproductive choice. Instead, both the right and the
interest are compared on separate dimensions of a single model
describing constitutionality. The independently derived value of the
liberty concern establishes the burden the government must meet to
demonstrate that the infringement is justified. The government's burden, therefore, is to advance and sufficiently support reasons to justify
an intrusion into individual liberty that has already been defined.
Describing constitutional adjudication in modeling terms has the
further advantage of accounting for the way constitutional decisions
might actually be reached. A common assumption among law students, if not lawyers and scholars, is that judges reason backward from
their conclusion to their premises. The balancing metaphor, however,
depicts a process by which judges simply place liberty and government
interests on some grand metaphysical scale and read the result. Mod37. It is important to again emphasize that the government's offer of proof, its justification for infringing individual liberty, has two aspects: (1) the normative basis for the
government action, and (2) the empirical nexus between the normative basis and the government action (i.e., as a factual matter, does the action accomplish the asserted purpose?).
See Faigman, MadisonianBalancing, supra note 4, at 665.
38. Such a statutory requirement was held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
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eling, however, describes a very different process. Because constitutionality is a separate factor altogether, reasoning "backwards" in
constitutional cases does not violate the metaphor. Modeling presupposes that there is content to the factor of constitutionality that can be
understood and measured separately. A judge, therefore, might begin
with an intuitive judgment regarding the "constitutionality" of a challenged government action. Of course, judges are obliged to explain
the bases for their conclusions and to persuade the reader that those
conclusions are correct. This process of explanation and persuasion
involves close examination of liberty and government interests. It
would not be unusual for a judge to modify her intuitive assessment of
constitutionality after conducting this close examination. Some opinions, as it is sometimes said, simply "will not write. '39
Being able to describe the constitutional equation does not, however, solve the problem of determining where to draw the line between constitutional and unconstitutional government actions. All
might agree that a two-parent consent without judicial bypass requirement is unconstitutional while a one-parent notification with judicial
bypass is constitutional. But what about the difficult cases in between? On this question, the model can prescribe no solution. Modeling is merely a process by which substantive value choices must be
made. It can only clarify the questions that must be asked-not give
answers. A method of constitutional adjudication can, at best, clarify
the terms of the debate. Ultimately, reasonable people will disagree
over the content of majority will and individual liberty. This debate
defines us as a society. By clarifying its terms, we can all understand
and contribute to it.
HI.

Aggregating Rights

As currently practiced, balancing suffers from a different apples
and oranges problem than was examined in the last section. Balancing schemes now compare aggregated government interests to individual freedoms on an amendment-by-amendment basis. In effect,
depending on how it is expressed, current balancing methods either
double-count government interests or they understate the depth of the
implicated liberty. A good illustration of this practice is Bell v. Wolfish.40 Wolfish involved, among other things, a challenge brought by
39. Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 307, 311 (1987).

40. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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federal prisoners to the "publisher-only" rule that prohibited inmates
from receiving hardcover books that are not mailed directly from the
publisher.41 The Court recognized that the publisher-only rule implicated both the First and Fifth Amendments. 42 The state justified the
rule on the ground that it was needed to prevent contraband from

entering the prison. 43 In separate sections of its opinion, the Court
found that the government's security need outweighed the prisoners'
First Amendment right 44 and that the government's security need outweighed the prisoners' right under the Fifth Amendment to not be

deprived of their property without due process of law.45
Amendment-specific balancing miscalculates the constitutional
costs attached to the publisher-only rule. Suppose, for example, if
such things could be measured, the First Amendment right implicated
is valued at four constitutional units and the Due Process property
right is also worth four constitutional units and there is no overlap in
the values the two amendments protect. And suppose further that the
government's interest in Wolfish could be quantified at six constitutional units. 46 By dividing the rights and evaluating them separately
against the reasons behind the regulation, the government's action
passes scrutiny under conventional balancing. If the full effect of the
constitutional infringement is assessed against the government interest, however, the action would be deemed unconstitutional.
To be sure, individual liberty and government interests do not
lend themselves to precise mathematical description. Moreover, it
must be emphasized, the cost in liberty of a particular government
action does not equal the sum of the amendment-specific freedoms
implicated; rather, liberty is the umbrella construct that judges must
assess, and the amendments merely set forth those freedoms that gain
shelter under that umbrella.
The failure to employ a transactional perspective seriously underestimates the injury to the individual. People do not suffer injury to
their liberty in a compartmentalized, amendment-specific way. The
conventional practice is something like calculating damages in torts
one arm and one leg at a time; the damage assessment will be seri41. Id at 527.
42. Id. at 550, 554.
43. Id. at 549.
44. Id. at 548-52.
45. Id. at 553-55.
46. This hypothetical also assumes that the units of measurement for liberty and government interests are the same. This assumption is not necessary to conduct the modeling
discussed in Part 11.
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ously minimized by assessing the paralysis of each limb instead of taking into account the fact that the plaintiff is completely disabled. 47 In
Wolfish, the deprivation of property that occurred was different than
other property deprivations, indeed much greater, because it involved
books. And the First Amendment concern too was different than
other First Amendment violations, because it involved the deprivation
47. Constitutional analysis is currently conducted in a fashion closely resembling civil
common-law causes of action. If a single set of facts establishes a cause of action under
both tort law and contract law, for instance, the actions effectively are litigated separately.
A civil litigant can respond with the same defense to both and prevail in both. Similarly, in
constitutional cases, one set of facts might implicate several amendments and the government can use the same justification as a defense for infringements of each.
In the civil law context, the principal reason for multiple causes of action is the very
different histories that inform tort and contract law. Tort and contract law evolved largely
independently of one another and are usually concerned with fundamentally different sets
of circumstances. Sometimes, however, torts and contracts theories converge as practitioners, scholars, or judges identify a set of circumstances that logically fit into both camps.
Interestingly, the nontransactional way of describing civil causes of action does not
extend to the method of measuring civil remedies. A plaintiff who prevails on both tort
and contract theories does not recover twice. Damages are always described in transactional terms. Although reconciling the perspective of the legal theory of causes of action
and the legal theory of recovery is beyond the scope of this Article, the differences in
outlook between the two theories might shed light on the constitutional question
presented.
Several explanations might account for why causes of action embrace a nontransactional perspective while remedies are transactional. First of all, the independent traditions
surrounding tort law and contract law evolved because the designers of these causes of
action were concerned with matters that appeared unconnected. When a single principle
lies at the bottom of two or more causes of action, we should expect them to converge in
time and eventually become one. The conceptual unity of the injury for remedial purposes
is obvious. In addition, the theoretical issue inherent in fashioning a cause of action is
entitlement; under a particular set of circumstances, is the claimant entitled to recover
from the defendant? At the remedy stage, however, the issue turns from entitlement to
relief. A cause of action defines responsibility; in contrast, in calculating the remedy, the
issue is not who but how much.
Many of the principles that contribute to a transactional perspective in civil litigation
inhere in constitutional adjudication. Unlike the checkered history of causes of action in
torts and contracts, constitutional adjudication, at least as regards infringements of individual liberty, stems from a single tradition and, therefore, should be conceptualized with a
fullness and unity unknown in the civil context. Although the Constitution contains many
particulars, its essential thrust, its core, contains but one object: safeguarding individual
liberty within a majoritarian democracy. This is the single lens through which most constitutional adjudication must be viewed. Indeed, constitutional adjudication more closely resembles the remedy stage than the initial stage when a cause of action is stated. In
constitutional cases, entitlement and responsibility are resolved initially in the determination whether the Constitution is implicated. Once a court begins to assess the relative
values of pertinent constitutional factors, the only question remaining concerns whether
the government's reasons justify the infringement. This issue is similar to the determination of an adequate remedy.
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of property. The cost in liberty simply cannot be calculated without
examining all of the consequences of the government action.
Evaluating the full cost in liberty is no more difficult conceptually

than aggregating government interests, a computation the Court performs regularly. Just as with government interests, aggregation is not
simply a matter of adding up amendments. Sometimes the cost in liberty caused by some government action that infringes one amendment
will far outweigh the costs when such action infringes several amendments. The cost in liberty of some government action, therefore, is
not affected by the number of amendments involved, but only by the
depth of liberty at stake. Courts would continue to depend upon the
constitutional text and other authorities to define liberty, but liberty
would not be divided into narrow compartments and tabulated in a

way that distorts its essential character.
The transactional perspective is hardly unknown to constitutional
law. The need to account for multiple rights when calculating constitutionality has been recognized in a host of constitutional contexts.
The most notorious of these is Griswold v. Connecticut,48 in which Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, identified the right of privacy as
situated in the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments. 49 Of course, the Court and commentators alike
have criticized Griswold's unorthodox approach. But the alleged error of Griswold does not lay in its aggregation of rights, but rather in
its failure to demonstrate that privacy could actually be found somewhere in the document. The criticism of privacy is that it does not
exist in any amendment, not that it is illegitimate to locate it in
several.
The concept of aggregating rights has influenced the Court's analysis in other contexts. In Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,50 for example, Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, expressly embraced the lesson that the nature of the review
changes when government action infringes on more than one right:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.5 1
48.
49.
50.
51.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 881.
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The transactional perspective would not cut constitutional interpretation loose from its textual or historical moorings. Instead, the
Court would continue to have to specify with particularity, and support with sufficient authority, the principles that compose individual
liberty in particular cases. In McCleskey v. Kemp,5 2 for example, the
Court rejected the petitioner's claim that Georgia's death penalty
scheme, which research indicated discriminated on the basis of the
race of the victim, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In classic style, the Court divided the two amendments and found the
Georgia capital sentencing scheme constitutional as against each.5 3 A
transactional perspective would not cut the Court loose to range
freely through the constitutional firmament. The Court would still be
obligated to identify the principles inherent in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the clause prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. But the transactional approach would require that these principles be combined in
order to obtain an accurate gauge of the injury suffered by the petitioner. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the injury felt by the challenger could be suffered in any way other than in toto. Georgia's act
of depriving Robert McCleskey of his life cannot be divided into its
constituent parts, for only one feature has any relevance. He can only
die once. His death sentence raises only one constitutional question:
Did Georgia's capital sentencing scheme operate to deprive him of a
protected freedom? To separate this question into its component
parts reflects a basic miscomprehension of what liberty means.
In fact, large areas of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence are
consistent with aggregating rights. For instance, implicit in the Court's
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process lies the insight that supports
aggregation: Liberty has content that transcends the specific categories of the Bill of Rights. As Justice Cardozo emphasized in Palko v.
Connecticut,5 4 determining that certain rights are incorporated "has
been dictated by a study and appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself."'55 Despite our traditional myopia
otherwise, liberty resists being cabined into discrete categories. The
guiding principle of the incorporation doctrine itself contemplates a
52.
53.
Eighth
54.
55.

481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See id. at 291-99 (regarding Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 299-308 (regarding
Amendment).
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Id. at 326.
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broader understanding. Only those rights are incorporated that "have
been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ' 56 This
test requires the interpreter to transcend a crabbed, compartmentalized view of the Bill of Rights. We know, not from any reading of the
text, that free speech is "fundamental," but the right to a jury in a civil
trial is not; yet the text of the Constitution states both rights equally
emphatically. The content of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights
comes from interpretations that transcend the document's specific
words. Justice Harlan eloquently repudiated a crabbed, compartmentalized approach to constitutional interpretation when he articulated
the basis for protecting unenumerated rights in his dissent in Poe v.
57
Ullman:
[The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints ... and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful
58 scrutiny of the state needs asserted to jus-

tify their abridgment.
The same wisdom that permits recognition of unenumerated rights
compels acceptance of aggregation of rights. If liberty is indivisible,
with specific rights giving value to indefinite points along a single continuum, compartmentalization of government infringements of liberty
is an exercise of judicial caprice.
The fundamental lesson of the Bill of Rights is that liberty is re-

ally just one freedom that is defined in various operational ways in
that document; indeed, the Ninth Amendment, whatever its substantive content, emphasizes how the blanket of liberty is woven from a
single thread. Professor Randy Barnett described how the Ninth
Amendment contains this very lesson: "Liberty rights define a boundary within which individuals and associations are free to do as they
wish. Because the ways by which this liberty can be exercised are unlimited, it is impossible to enumerate all the specific rights that people
possess.

' 59

Liberty has a richness, complexity, and multiplicity that

resists simple compartmentalization or specific enumeration. It is ex56.
57.
58.
59.
Law, 14

Id. at 325.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Randy Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of
HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 615, 626 (1991).
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pansive and must be compared against the equally expansive concept
of government interests. The process of aggregating rights merely
asks the ultimate constitutional question: To what degree has the
challenged government action infringed liberty? A transactional approach would require that the government's purposes be measured
against the individual's full liberty right.
A. Generality in the Procedure
Aggregation of rights clarifies the full constitutional costs of a
particular government action. But it also potentially aggravates a
traditional complication of constitutional adjudication, the problem of
selecting the level of generality by which to analyze the liberty interest
at risk. Two aspects of "generality" are pertinent in balancing cases.
First, the balancing process itself occurs along a fairly wide spectrum,
ranging from case-specific or "ad hoc" balancing to generalized or
"definitional" balancing. And second, balancing methods must resolve the interpretive debate concerning the level of abstractness at
which the right is conceptualized. The former aspect is inherent in the
choice to use balancing methods, the latter is endemic throughout
constitutional adjudication. Modeling confronts these two "generality" difficulties in the same way that balancing methods do. It should
be noted, however, that these two generality concerns are largely independent of one another.
An example will assist the discussion. In Maryland v. Craig,60 the
defendant complained that a Maryland law which permitted a child
witness to testify via one-way, closed-circuit television violated his
Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness. 61 The purpose of the
Maryland law was to protect child victims of sexual assault from the
psychological trauma that might result from testifying in open court. 62
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, rejected Justice Scalia's categorical argument that "confront" means face-to-face. 63 Instead,
O'Connor interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require trial courts to
balance the psychological effects to the individual witness against the
64
defendant's confrontation right.
This ad hoc balancing test presents several difficulties for the trial
courts that must apply it. Obviously, one side of the balancing equa60. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

842.
852.
844.
855.
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tion changes from case to case: the psychological trauma the witness
is likely to experience. The other side, the liberty concern protected
by the Confrontation Clause, is less easily gauged. In this ad hoc balancing, does a defendant who is accused of murder and potentially
may be sentenced to death have a greater confrontation right than a
defendant who is accused of attempted sexual assault, which carries a
penalty of three to five years in prison? In applying an ad hoc balance, the Court requires, by definition, a case-by-case assessment of
the government interests, defined here as the psychological trauma
expected to be suffered by the witness. Intuitively, it would appear,
balancing should require congruence between the levels of generality
on each side of the scale.
In contrast to ad hoc balancing, we would expect that both the
government's interests and individual liberty would be calculated generally in definitional balancing. New York v. Ferber65 nicely illustrates
the definitional balancing context. In Ferber, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a state regulation that prohibited child pornography. The Court balanced the class of child pornographers' free speech
rights against the government's interest in protecting the class of children victimized by pornography. 66 The same level of generality informed both sides of the balance. 67
In practice, however, courts regularly violate this symmetry by
balancing a generalized or abstract factor on one side of the equation
while the other side is described in concrete, case-specific terms. The
cases following Maryland v. Craig illustrate how courts insist on a
showing of a specific need for testimony via closed-circuit television,
while, at the same time, not altering the necessary proof as the risk to
the defendant's liberty changes. For example, in Spigarolo v.
Meachum, 68 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding that a trial court must find by clear and
convincing evidence a compelling need to take testimony outside the
presence of the defendant. 6 9 The court did not intimate that this standard might change as the costs to the defendant increase or decrease.
Symmetry in the balancing process might require proof beyond a rea65. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
66. Id. at 763-64 ("[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.").
67. Id. at 756-64.
68. 934 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 21.
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sonable doubt when a defendant is at risk of a life term or death, but
only proof by a preponderance of the evidence when the penalty is
relatively slight.
The practice of describing the factors on the two sides of the
scales at different levels of generality is an effective rhetorical technique. As long as the defendant's Sixth Amendment right is described
abstractly, it is difficult to appreciate fully. When balancing, how can
this abstract right possibly compare to the psychological trauma that
the child witness might suffer if she testifies in the defendant's presence? The comparison becomes easier to appreciate, however, when
the defendant's specific liberty is taken into account. A defendant
confronting life imprisonment might have an overwhelming right to
confront her accuser. This insight is an essential aspect of analyses of
the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment; this insight should extend to the right to confront witnesses in the same amendment. Descriptions can substantially affect perceptions.
Generalized
descriptions diffuse and thus minimize the value that might be attributed to the right or interest.
In fact, by failing to use the same level of generality on both sides
of the balance, courts violate an essential premise of the method. If,
in fact, a single scale describes the intersection of individual liberty
and government interests, the factors must be measured in the same
units. To do otherwise is akin to comparing the weight of an apple in
ounces to the weight of an orange in grams. The comparison is possible, but a conversion table would be necessary to understand the result. Balancing, therefore, does not so much prescribe a particular
level of generality along the spectrum from ad hoc to definitional, as it
does require that the same level be used to describe the two principles
of government power and individual freedom.
This aspect of balancing raises some potential difficulty for my
proposed model. Foremost, unlike balancing methods, Constitutional
Modeling does not require measurement on the same scale. Moreover, since government power and individual freedom are defined independently, there are good reasons to expect the level of generality
to vary considerably from context to context. These two concerns will
be considered in turn. First, although Modeling does not mandate a
common scale, the equation nonetheless requires that a single perspective be applied. In much the same way as in balancing, incorporating different levels of analysis when defining the factors will
inevitably skew the results. This requirement is a function of all algebraic expressions.
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The second concern-that defining liberty and government interests separately will lead to different levels of analysis-assumes that,
at least sometimes, the constitutional text specifies the level of generality. However, rarely, if ever, is the level of generality specified by
the text. Instead, the level of generality is dictated by either the specific context in which the question arose or jurisprudential considerations dictating the need for a general rule or the necessity of case-bycase adjudications. These factors are tied to the specific transaction
(or similarly occurring transactions). Hence, for Modeling purposes
the resolution of the level of generality is not a function of the character of government power or the content of individual freedom, but
rather is a function of the nature of the transaction being measured.
B. Generality in the Conceptualization of the Right
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,70 Justice Scalia argued that rights
should be defined at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified. ' '71 He believed this approach offered the only nonarbitrary
interpretive method available. Scalia's argument touched off a lively
debate among members of the Court7 2 as well as among constitutional
scholars. 73 For example, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Michael H.,
criticized the basic operating premise of Scalia's argument:
In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom
not to conform. The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from history before protecting anything in
the name of liberty.... The document that the plurality construes
today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the living charter that I have
taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a
time long past.74
Constitutional Modeling does not specifically offer a solution to this
debate, for the level of generality selected raises primarily substantive
interpretive questions rather than procedural matters of adjudication.
Nonetheless, adjudication through Modeling, and in particular the
prescription of rights aggregation, necessarily touches this debate.
70. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
71. Id.at 127-28 n.6.
72. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (debating the correct interpretation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause); Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (arguing over
the definition of personal jurisdiction).
73. Compare Bork, supra note 6, at 150 with LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DoR, ON READING THE CoNsTrTIoN 79-80 (1991).
74. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf challenge Justice
Scalia's claim to have discovered a means to avoid value choices in
selecting a level of generality. 75 In short, they contend that Scalia's
prescription to select "the most specific level" dictated by societal tradition fails because it is impossible to perform this procedure in a
value-neutral fashion.76 More important to my thesis is Tribe and
Dorf s proposed alternative vision. They argue that because judges
must generalize, 77 they should select a level of abstraction that, first, is
"connected to the constitutional text,' '78 and, second, is supported by
79
principles that fit both history and precedent.
It is significant that Tribe and Dorf begin their critique of Scalia's
proposal and ultimately rest their alternative vision on the excerpt
quoted above from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman. They
use Harlan's statement that the Due Process Clause "'is not a series of
isolated points"''8 0 to emphasize the interpolative and extrapolative
character of interpretation. The lesson they draw from Harlan is that
a "unifying principle at a higher level of abstraction" can be ascertained beyond the "set of specific liberties that the Bill of Rights explicitly protects." 81 This process of abstraction permits articulation of
unenumerated rights that fit the history and precedent of rights specifically enumerated. In essence, specific unenumerated rights are identified as necessarily flowing from rights explicit in the Bill of Rights.
The present proposal embraces this meaning of the Harlan passage and takes it a step further. Because liberty "is not a series of
isolated points," it not only is manifested in certain unenumerated
ways, but its measure cannot be ascertained except in its entirety. In
selecting a level of abstraction when defining the individual liberty
component of the balance, therefore, judges must consult history and
tradition pertaining to the exercise of the full freedom threatened by
the government action. Judges should articulate abstract principles
around the complete context presented by a government action. In
75. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 1057, 1085-98 (1990).
76. Id. at 1086. They also argue that "even if Justice Scalia's program were workable,
it would achieve judicial neutrality by all but abdicating the judicial responsibility to protect individual rights." Id.
77. Id. at 1099 ("Like it or not, judges must squarely face the task of deciding how
abstractly to define our liberties.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1102.
80. Id. at 1068 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
81.

Id.
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Bell v. Wolfish, therefore, the query concerns the level of generality
when the government deprives an individual of property protected by
the First Amendment. This principle can range from the very specific
(the right of a state prison inmate not to be deprived of hardcover
books not sent by publishers) to the very general (the right of an individual not to be deprived of property that facilitates the exercise of
free speech). The process of Modeling is agnostic regarding what
level of generality is chosen; it mandates, however, that the level of
generality be constructed at a transactional level of analysis. Liberty,
as a whole, becomes the subject of definition, rather than a specific
isolated right. Liberty cannot be seen well in a sketch of "isolated
points"; it must be painted in full detail. Only then can freedom be
fully guaranteed within a political democracy.
Conclusion
The principal complaint leveled against the balancing method is
that, conceptually, it is impossible to truly weigh individual liberty
against government interests. Such a comparison, critics complain, is
like comparing apples and oranges or the length of lines to the weight
of rocks. The search for the common denominator shibboleth, it turns
out, is indeed futile because no common denominator exists. Acceptance of this insight, however, does not mean that judges should abandon a standards-based assessment of the weights of liberty and
government interests. Although the relationship between these two
fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence is slightly more
complicated than a simple arithmetical comparison of weights, such a
relationship can indeed be described.
Liberty and government interests are independent factors that
can only be fully described through a third factor: constitutionality.
As this Article explores, these three factors conform easily to algebraic expression. In contrast to the simple mathematical assumptions
of balancing's critics, this model of constitutionality requires no common denominator. Recognition of the algebraic nature of constitutional analysis should promote a robust and well-delineated debate
regarding the nature of individual freedom and the extent of government power.
Finally, in framing this debate, individual freedom must be defined at the same level of abstraction as government interests, that is,
on a transactional basis. When measuring the constitutional costs associated with a government action judges should employ a method
that considers the full liberty value implicated by that action, rather
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than the crabbed, compartmentalized, amendment-specific approach
that is now commonplace in constitutional adjudication. In effect, this
method entails aggregation of rights. But only by viewing individual
freedom through this inclusive lens can the full costs in freedom of a
particular government action be seen. Without this lens, constitutional adjudication suffers from a myopia that blinds it to significant
deprivations of individual freedom.
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